Population Movement in the Fluid, Fragile and Contentious Borderland between Bangladesh and India by Afsar, Rita
 1
POPULATION MOVEMENT IN THE FLUID, FRAGILE AND 
CONTENTIOUS BORDERLAND BETWEEN BANGLADESH AND INDIA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Paper Prepared for Presentation at 
PANEL 24: Migration in South Asia: Causes, Patterns and Consequences 
At the 20th European Conference on the Modern South Asian Studies (ECMSAS): 
 
IN THE SCHOOL OF ARTS, HISTORY AND CULTURE 
UNVERSITY OF MANCHESTER 
UNITED KINGDOM 
JULY 7-11, 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BY 
RITA AFSAR, PhD 
SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW  
BANGLADESH INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES (BIDS) 
E-17 AGARGOAN SHERE BANGLA NAGAR 
DHAKA 
E-MAIL: rita@sdnbd.org, rita_afsar@yahoo.com.au 
 
 2
POPULATION MOVEMENT IN THE FLUID, FRAGILE AND 
CONTENTIOUS BORDERLAND BETWEEN BANGLADESH AND INDIA 
 
1.1. Introductory Remarks 
Trans-border population flux in the post-colonial South Asia is diversified, 
complex of many elements, phases and incidents, which began with deep rooted scar 
of an arbitrary Radcliffe border that uprooted tens and millions of Hindu and Muslim 
populations from both sides of the border and killing many in the communal violence 
in 1947 when the subcontinent was divided. That mass exodus occurred once more in 
1971 with Pakistani atrocities which eventually led to the birth of Bangladesh as an 
independent nation. In the intermittent period between 1947 and 1971 and the 
aftermath also cross-border migration between Bangladesh and India did not stop 
rather continued in different forms, intensity and magnitude often on a continuous 
basis and also seasonal, and may be sporadic fuelled by some major upheavals be it 
communal, environmental or displacement as a result of massive construction.  
However, it is difficult to distinguish different forms migration due largely to 
political reasons. Apart from historicity the two countries are heavily motivated 
politically. Indian government branded all sorts of cross-border migration as illegal 
and Bangladeshi government refuses to acknowledge illegal cross-border movements 
by Bangladeshi nationals. Their negative attitudes have been posing serious problems 
in understanding the issues involved in cross-border migration in a comprehensive 
manner and deal with those issues realistically.  
The paper is essentially divided into four parts. Gleaning through the colonial 
era the paper documents a few major features of the Radcliffe Border that divided 
India and Bangladesh in order to generate better understanding of the contextual 
issues involved in the cross-border migration between the two countries in the first 
part. For a fuller picture of the context the setting part is then supplemented by the 
situational analysis of the magnitude and the extent of the cross-border migration 
between these two countries from the available data along with a discussion on the 
problems of reliable data which makes empirical research a challenging task. Part two 
examines the causes of migration both from the demand and supply side applying an 
economic framework of livelihoods of the inhabitants of both sides of the border. 
Consequences of migration are presented in part three followed by the management 
problems and policy issues in the fourth or the last part. 
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1.2. Colonial Legacy of a Fluid, Fragile and Contentious Border 
Trans-border migration is diversified in nature as it involves commuting, 
seasonal, circular, temporary and permanent forms of labour migration, movement of 
refugees, clandestine migration and even trafficking of women and children. 
Multiplicity in the forms, nature and modalities of cross-border migration from 
Bangladesh defy distinction between self-smuggling, commuting, migration-by-
consent and trafficking (Andreas, 2000; Kyle and Koslowski (eds.) 2001). This is not 
simply labour migration because complexity of cross-border migration and trade is 
rooted in the historical fallacies associated with border demarcation and heavily 
politically loaded approach. 
Bangladesh inherited disputed border relation with India as a legacy of the 
partition of the subcontinent in 1947. The border between India and Pakistan known 
as Radcliffe border after Sir Cyril Radcliffe was drawn within six weeks “on the basis 
of ascertaining the contiguous areas of Muslims and Non-Muslims”. Arbitrariness is 
the predominant feature of this partition because it was almost impossible to maintain 
a Muslim-Hindu divide geographically. Thus the border that separated Bangladesh 
from India had “ran through the Bengali heartland, separating tens of millions of 
Bengalis on the one side from tens of millions of Bengalis on the other” (Van 
Schandel, 2006). Thus for example, Murshidabad, a Muslim dominated district of 
East Pakistan was transferred to India whereas Chittagong Hill Tracts a non-Muslim 
majority district of India was transferred to Pakistan. Moreover the wandering rivers 
of active Bengal delta did not fit in this rigid state border and char lands remained 
disputed ever since.1 The border also runs across chars – silt islands formed by banks 
of silt-laden large rivers that are most difficult to administer because of their high 
fluidity causing great mobility among its inhabitants.  
In this process both India and Bangladesh share a highly contentious and 
volatile border stretching more than 4000 kilometers of land areas covering three 
sides of Bangladesh. They also share 191 exchangeable enclaves and 32 non-
exchangeable enclaves between themselves. In May 1974 both countries agreed to 
exchange the enclaves, and to conduct referendum for the inhabitants to decide 
                                                 
1 Much of the Bengal border ran through an active delta and rivers flowing in active deltas are 
generally mobile. Inhabitants of Bengal for long adopted migration e.g. settler emigration  to Assam or 
migration from Barisal to Dhaka on a regular basis as a strategy to deal with frequent changing of 
routes by major rivers and river erosion. Special regulations were in place regarding land rights along 
riverbanks and even ‘under water’ based on diara surveys that dealt exclusively with settlement of land 
rights along rivers (Van Schendel, 2006). 
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whether they would like to stay or move to their parent country. Whilst Bangladesh 
enacted legislation to fulfill its agreement, India has yet to do so. The only 
achievement in this regard is that by transferring Berubari to India, Bangladesh got 
permission to use the Tin Bigha  Corridor, a gateway to Bangladeshi enclaves inside 
India in 1992 (Yasmin, 2007).2  However, several border issues remained unresolved 
that often lead to cross-border confrontations and make the borders potentially 
explosive as political forces of either side can exploit them. 
 
1.3. Magnitude and Extent of Cross-Border Migration 
Different sources put the figure of Bangladeshi migrants between 12 and 20 
million. Existing estimates suggest that Bangladeshi migration to India occurs mainly 
from eastern side of India with three states namely -- West Bengal, Assam and 
Tripura serving as major conduits of the flow, which also spread further to Bihar, 
Delhi and Rajasthan and even to Maharastra (Table 1.2). Little wonder then to find 
disproportionately large share of Bangladeshi migrants borne by West Bengal (40%), 
Assam (30%), Delhi (11%) and Tripura (7%), compared to the remaining states that 
have around 3.7% of the migrants.  
However, any estimate on migration from Bangladesh to India must be treated 
with caution. It is not only a matter of distinguishing forms and modalities involved in 
cross-border migration but also a question of political sensitivity involved in the 
approach to the issue which often render getting reliable statistics on the magnitude of 
temporary workers impossible. In the first place, Bangladeshi diasporas are 
underclass in India where they are neither accepted by the authorities nor by the 
mainstream population at large. They do not get any leverage from the Bangladeshi 
government either as it does not acknowledge the incidence of cross-border migration.  
Second, there are large streams of commuters involved in illegal trade and 
other forms of occupations across border but there is no reliable statistics on them. 
Third, for procuring Indian visa a migrant or a visitor has to indicate the purpose of 
the visit. So from Indian foreign ministry it is not impossible to get data on temporary 
work related migration. However, the reality is that large movement of workers 
actually occurs illegally and in the absence of return migration data from Bangladesh, 
                                                 
2 Instead of bisection, the border created more than 200 territorial units of which 74 Bangladeshi 
enclaves are in Cooch Behar and 123 Indian enclaves are in Rangpur and Dinajpur (for details see 
Whyte (2002). 
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it is rather difficult to trace temporary workers from foreign ministry’s data base. 
Wherever possible statistics on the magnitude of different forms of migration are 
provided, but these are drawn from available sources predominantly emanating from 
India which are largely based on educated guess and often politically biased as cross-
border migration is poorly researched in Bangladesh.  
The most disturbing part of data problems relates to variations in the estimates 
of Bangladeshi populations from different Indian sources. For example, the Governor 
of Assam in 1998 gave a staggering figure of 13.2 million Bangladesh migrants in 
India. In the same year an official affidavit put up before the Supreme Court of India 
estimated a total number of 1024,322 Bangladeshi nationals entered into India with 
valid documents but overstayed and did not return back to Bangladesh during 1972-
1998. During the same period over five million Bangladeshi nationals were detected 
for entering clandestinely in India and pushed back across the border.3  In 2003, the 
then Indian Defence Minister, Mr. George Fernandez reported that on an average 
100,000 Bangladeshis enter illegally to India every month (The Times of India, 29th 
September 2003). Moreover despite its denial, the 1991 census report of Bangladesh 
mentioned about an unique phenomenon of missing population, estimated initially at 
10 million and subsequently at 8 million, of whom 1.73 million are Hindus, and 6.27 
million are Muslims (Ray, 2002). With these caveats in mind some established 
patterns of Bangladeshi migration to India have been discussed in this paper along 
with the causes and consequences.  
 
Table 2.1: Relative Share of Bangladeshi migrants in various states 
 
States Percentage of Bangladeshi migrants 
West Bengal 40% 
Assam 30% 
Delhi 11% 
Tripura 7% 
Bihar 3.7% 
Rajasthan 3.7% 
Maharashtra 3.7% 
 
Source: Estimates based on Sinha report, 1998 
(www.saag.org/papers7/paper632.html) 
 
 
                                                 
3 Supreme Court of India, Writ Petition (Civil) no. 125 of 1998 in the matter of AIFCL & another. 
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2.1. Causes of Migration  
Continuous demand for cheap labour from Indian side is one of the major factors 
behind the flow of Bangladeshi migration to India. Agriculture in Punjab, 
urbanization in New Delhi, cotton and diamond industries in Gujrat, irrigation 
projects in West Bengal have attracted main ‘sweat labour’ (Samaddar, 1999). It is 
argued that Bangladesh serves as a crucial reserve pool of cheap labour for the 
economies of Assam, West Bengal, Delhi, Mumbai and other parts of India. Thus 
Schendel (2005: 230) remarked: “If there were indeed 12 to 20 million unauthorized 
Bangladeshis in India, there were millions of Indians keen to employ them. The 
Indian state never developed schemes either to hold these Indian citizens accountable 
for their illegal practices of employing ‘aliens’, or to issue temporary work permits to 
labour migrants from Bangladesh”.  
  
• Demand side story 
(i) Need for cheap labour for India’s booming economy 
Availability of cheap labour supply is one of the critical factors determining prices 
of many commodities including construction materials, food, manufactured goods, 
etc. Samaddar (1999) for example cited the case of Bharati brick field that sold brick 
at a much higher price when it faced scarcity of cheap migrant labour in 1993 and 
1994 as a result of flushing out strategy adopted by police and security forces in West 
Bengal to push off cheap migrant labour from Bangladesh.4  Notwithstanding those 
occasional flushing out measures, his research also suggests existence of a well 
developed chain of recruiters and dalals or agents of brokerage system from both 
sides for hiring cheap migrant labour from Bangladesh.  
Thus for example, contractors of construction sector including brick fields operate 
on both sides of the border and they employ labour recruiting agents “deep in 
Bangladesh who recruit labour by advancing Indian money (in the form of plastic 
cards). Labour supply is thus assured and production is regular”.  Increasing demand 
for domestic help in large cities also created demand for cheap migrant labour and 
Bangladeshi migrant women predominantly provide personal care services. Further, 
Schendel (2005: 231) has argued that infiltration theory developed by Indian 
politicians helped drawing public attention to the cost factor of unauthorized 
                                                 
4 Prices of bricks soared from Rs.1200 per thousand bricks to Rs.1500 during these periods (see 
Samaddar, 1999 for a detail account). 
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immigration in terms of law enforcement and state services, served as vote getter, on 
the one hand and on the other, stigmatizing immigrant labour to keep them cheap and 
pliable. 
 (ii) Illegal Border trade and fragile livelihoods 
Illegal border trade and fragile livelihoods often promote illegal migration. 
Evidence suggests that number of Muslim population who migrate illegally largely 
for economic reason from Bangladesh to India is more than twice or three times as 
large as Hindu population. For example out of 55,553 illegal immigrants apprehended 
by BSF in 1991, 13,457 were Hindus and 42,090 were Muslims (Samaddar, 1999). 
This however, contradicts conventional wisdom which upholds predominance of 
minority population from the country of origin in the cross-border flows. Commuters 
not only include daily wage labourers but illegal traders or smugglers from both home 
and host countries figure prominently. Estimates suggest that goods worth US$ two 
billion entered Bangladesh in 2004 (Sobhan, 2005) with the help of informal traders 
or their agents who physically transport the product across the common border.  
Similar incidence of cross-border trade was also observed in the case of 
Tripura where the local residents complained against border fencing on the ground 
that it will destroy the area’s economy reliant heavily on cross-border informal trade 
(Bhoumik, 2005). From thriving industries and businesses on both sides of the border 
that depends on smuggled parts, raw materials and goods, to impoverished residents 
in the border areas who make a living by acting as ‘carriers’ – transporting goods to 
and from the border, all depend on illegal commuting. Considerable numbers of 
Indian nationals are also involved in illegal migration largely as traders and 
facilitators of illegal trades.5 Cross-border informal trade involves minimal level of 
risks due to institutionalised system of bribes paid to security agencies and low-levels 
of fines imposed on confiscated goods (Ramachandran, 2007).  
 
 (iii) Smuggling and trafficking goes hand-in-hand 
To a great extent smuggling and trafficking operates in an ambiguous area that is 
neither purely voluntary nor involuntary from the perspective of the migrant. This is 
because a large number of them know “that they will be smuggled illegally across 
border to work, and they sometimes know the nature of their work – what they often 
                                                 
5 Fascinating incidents of illegal trade has been documented by Van Schendel, 2005 
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do not know is the terms of the ‘contract’” (Kyle and Koslowski (eds.) 2001). Women 
constitute a significant proportion in this flows for multiple reasons be it their 
ignorance which makes them easy prey to dalals’ false promises of employment or 
greater eagerness to escape poverty in the context of extremely limited opportunities 
for earning cash income or because of greater demand from dalals’ side given the 
high profit margin derived from trafficking (INCIDIN Bangladesh, 2002). In many 
cases women migrants realize that they are trafficked only after they reach 
destinations e.g. India, Pakistan, the Gulf States or South East Asia, where they are 
largely for economic reason sold to sweatshops or brothels (Schendel, 2005).6 
Estimates suggest that each year around 5000 women and children are trafficked to 
Pakistan through India (Gazi, 2001).   
 
• Supply side story 
(i) Growth of migration industry 
Migration industry composed of well-organized network of dalals in Bangladesh 
and India together with recruiting agencies, recruiters, touts, brokers, informers, travel 
agents and their employees and contacts in many Bangladeshi border side villages 
help escalating new forms of transnational flows.7  Migration industry facilitates 
migration to India and minimises the risk of settlement by offering necessary 
document e.g. passport, ration card, etc for substantial sum of money (Mahmood, 
1998). Under the situation potential migrants may be lured by employment trap set by 
dalals and women migrants may end up as prostitutes (Blanchet, 2002).  
Research also suggests that a considerable number of women migrants are sold as 
wives to widowed villagers along railway routes in the north Indian states of Uttar 
Pradesh, Punjab and Rajasthan (Blanchet, 2003). Moreover as indicated earlier, a 
large number of migrants tend to move into relatively prosperous urban centres like 
New Delhi and Mumbai where there is constant demand of cheap labour cannot be 
dismissed for both men and women migrants (Ramachandran, 2006). 
 
 
                                                 
6 Schendel has also argued that although men, women and children are smuggled across the 
Bangladesh-India border but the trafficking of women has attracted most attention.  From his own 
research he cited the cases of reverse migration of Indian girls in search of work or to marry a 
Bangladeshi man. 
7 For details on migration industry see Castles and Miller, 2003. 
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(ii) Survival and betterment framework 
Using both survival and betterment framework (www.saag.org/papers7/ 
paper632.html) as the major causes of migration many Indian scholars tried explain 
cross-border migration from Bangladesh. With a more than 1000 persons cramming 
per square kilometre land in Bangladesh where the average GNP per capita is around 
five hundred dollars and the employment opportunities are limited, migration whether 
internal, cross-border and overseas is always high. India is often preferred because of 
geographic proximity and cultural affinity facilitated by strong presence and support 
from social networks, apart from economic dictates. According to Lin and Paul (1995) 
pull of Indian economy is high because job prospects is much higher in large cities 
like Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata and so is the daily wage rate, and over and above, the 
lower price of food and consumer goods which increases purchasing power of an 
unskilled agricultural wage earner in India at least five times that in Bangladesh make 
Indian economy considerably attractive for Bangladeshi migrants.8  
Prospect of long-term settlement which Ramachandran (2005) has termed as 
‘becoming Indian’ should not ignored. With relatively lesser cost of migration offered 
to broker than for example migration to ME countries and cheaper way to buy Indian 
official documents necessary to prove Indian identity, many men, women and 
children migrate India. They generally occupy the lowest social echelons and join the 
vast ranks of the urban poor living in slums and shanties in large cities of India. 
 
 (iii) India as transit to onward migration 
Passage to India is also used as a transit to onward migration -- Pakistan and 
the ME countries, a move the Indian press describes as “ex-filtration”. In 2000 
Fredrick (2000:68) estimated around 1.5 to 2 million Bangladeshi migrants are there 
in Karachi. To avoid the heavy barbed-wire fencing running across much of the India-
Pakistan border, Bangladeshi often chose either the most dangerous route through 
Thar desert and the Rann of Kutch or the line of control between India-held and 
Pakistan-held Kashmir. Neither is safe and often those infiltrators, mostly women and 
children died due to thirst while crossing the Thar Desert (Rahman, 1997). The danger 
of police raid and subsequently confinement in Indian jails in the latter route has been 
                                                 
8 With high inflation and the escalation of the food prices in India like its neighbour, one may tempt to 
contest this proposition. It is also important to examine whether the flow and pattern of migration has 
changed in the advent of the global inflation and food crisis. 
 10
amply evidenced (Sharma, 1998). Anecdotal evidence suggests that while traversing 
this long route from Bengal to Kashmir they are accompanied by brokers at several 
points who leave them near the border to cross over to Pakistan alone.  
There is a well-established network of brokers who charge money for their 
service which does not however ensure immunity from police raid. Motivation for 
earning cash income is very strong and this is supported by kinship and social 
networks both in India and Pakistan and deeply entrenched dalal or brokerage system 
who often mediate between origin and destination to facilitate cross-border migration 
(Ahmed, 1997; Frederick and Kelly, 2000). Thus in her Frontline article (‘on a 
dangerous journey’) Parveen Swami  (5 March 2003) remarked: “No number  of 
barbed wires, fences and machine guns, it is clear can stop the movement of the 
desperately poor to where they think they may find food and shelter”. 
 
 (iv) Natural calamities and man-made disasters 
Destabilising factors such as ecological vulnerabilities emanating from 
massive floods, draught, river erosion, cyclones and communal riots that render 
millions people homeless causing involuntary migration.  Bangladesh suffers from 
many climate dependent riverine floods, riverbank erosion, tropical cyclones and 
droughts. Massive floods and riverbank erosion cause loss of land, displacement of 
human population and livestock, disruption of production, evacuation and loss of 
property.  According to existing estimates, natural hazards displace millions of people 
each year of which riverbank erosion alone displaces 60,000-70,000 people on 
average (Elahi et al. 1991; Hye, 2006).  
Research also suggests that the number of people crossing over to India 
increases during period of environmental disaster albeit inherent law of migration 
contemplates short distance move to areas which are compatible geographically and 
culturally.9 The UNCHR report on world’s state of refugees put this figure of 
environment led involuntary migration at around 12-17 million who migrated to 
neighbouring Indian states of West Bengal, Assam and Tripura driven largely by 
survival motive.10  Samaddar (1999) argued that constructions of big dams, bridges 
                                                 
9 Ahmad, Imtiaz quoted in Sanjoy Hazarika, India and its North East: The Challenges of Regionalism 
and Migration, in Kousar J. Azam (ed) Ethnicity, Identity and the State in South Asia. South Asian 
Publishers, New Delhi, 2001, p. 200. 
10 Note this is cumulative one-way figure since 1950s and without any statistics on return migration it 
is difficult to say the exact magnitude of migrants. 
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and barrages etc often result in massive population displacement.  Flood Action 
Programs (FAP) alone “have affected wetlands, fisheries and char lands, leading to 
further erosion, salinity, and the decline of employment potential for women in 
particular”, all of which in the long run induce migration (p.157). 
Insecurity led migration by religious minorities is another dimension of push 
migration across border. Ever since the birth of Bangladesh Hindu population grew 
only marginally and their relative share in the total population declined considerably. 
According to 2001 census the size of Hindu population was 11.6 million which means 
since the past 27 years only 1.7 million population was added yielding a 0.6% annual 
average growth rate. By contrast Muslim population almost doubled from 61 million 
to 111 million and the annual average growth rate was 2.2% during the same period. 
Therefore, share of Hindu population to the country’s total population declined from 
13.5% to 9.2% during the same period and by 1.79% since 1991, whilst the relative 
composition of Christians and Buddhist population did not change.11  
Obviously, it indicates out-migration by Hindu population, which is destined 
largely to India. During the same time districts in West Bengal bordering Bangladesh 
showed higher population growth rate than non-bordering districts which tend to 
suggest population expansion through cross-border migration (Samaddar, 1999). 
Insecurity could be one of the major factors behind their migration. This insecurity 
could be economic due to loss of land and other assets; political and psychological 
from the point of view of the religious standing in the new or changed religious 
contour of the old settlement where the threat of communal tensions is high accruing 
from marginalized status of minority religious group.  
For similar reasons reverse flow of Indian nationals to Bangladesh also occurs 
although little information is available on this account. From newspaper clippings 
Schendel (2005) cited a few evidence. For example, in 1998 about 10,000 migrants 
from Mizoram (India) moved to Chittagong Hill Tracks (CHT) (The Hindu, 28th 
March 1998). During Gujrat violence in 2002 several hundreds of Indian Muslims 
flee to Bangladesh and 200 migrants were recorded by the Times of India (18th May 
2002). Ahmad (2001) also noted that there are around 100,000 Indian migrants who 
have legally migrated to work in different multinational companies in Bangladesh. 
 
                                                 
11 According to Guha Thakurta (1999), “a total of 5.3 million Hindus, i.e. on average 200,000 per year 
have gone “missing” during 1974-1991”.  
 12
3.1.    Consequences of Cross-Border Migration 
Researches from India reveal that in Kolkata and Delhi Bangladeshi migrants 
have carved out a niche for themselves as domestic helps, construction labours, 
rickshaw pullers and rag pickers. In Mumbai “they are crucial as weavers and zari 
(embroidery with gold or silver threads) workers (Namboodiri, 1998; Padmanabhan, 
1998; Lin and Paul, 1995). Rickshaw pullers and day labourers in many border towns 
such as Agartala (Tripura), Silchar (Assam), or Siliguri (West Bengal) are 
overwhelmingly drawn from Bangladeshi migrants (Maheswari, 1998; Samaddar, 
1999; Hazarika, 2000). There is also a large volume of commuters and seasonal 
migrants who travel to and forth across the border (Hossain and Banerjee, 2004). 
Bangladeshi women from Rajshahi for example provide cheap labour to Indian 
cigarette and bangle factories and in 1998, 10,000 rickshaw pullers in Shiliguri town 
came from Bangladesh illegally (Maheswari, 1998). To quote Samaddar (1999) who 
cites borderlanders’ expression on this: “the border means coming and going; ‘asha 
jawa’; ‘okhane chash, ekhane lekhapara’ (cultivation there, studies here); ‘opare 
chash, epare bash’ (land for tilling there, house for living here)”.  
Ramchandran (2004) further remarked that on the one hand, Bangladeshi 
migrants have adapted local norms and practices e.g. learning Hindi, putting bindi (a 
dot on forehead), etc and on the other, they have established kinship bonds with 
Indian Muslim communities through marriage, thereby strengthening their ties to 
India. It may be worthwhile to mention that one of the Bangladeshi migrants 
remarked, “After crossing the border, we all become West Bengalis”.12  
Notwithstanding their adaptation, typically a migrant who crosses the border 
becomes a ‘transnational’ migrant for all intents and purposes given the complexities 
and complications including legality issue involved in cross-border migration. Whilst 
Bangladeshi migrants who transgress illegally become transnational and stateless, for 
similar reason Indian migrants living illegally in Bangladesh may find greater 
flexibility in border regulation. For example, in 2001 West Bengal authorities 
abandoned border fencing when they found about 1500 Indians lived illegally in Char 
Meghna on Bangladesh territory (Schendel, 2005). 
Fall back position of the Bangladeshi migrant to India is further compounded 
by the fact that they have little option to come back home as the Bangladeshi 
                                                 
12 See Blanchet (2002) for detailed narratives from Bangladeshi migrants in India. 
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government does not acknowledge any forms of cross-border migration from 
Bangladesh to India. This does not however, mean that they do not move back and 
forth crossing the border or cease to maintain connection with their friends, relatives 
and family members living in the home country.  
  
• Complexities of stateless unrecognised migrants 
Schendel (2005) put forward three strong arguments to explain transnational 
character of millions of Bangladeshi migrant in India. In the first place he argued that 
these migrants are not accepted as Indian citizens either by the government or by the 
mainstream Indian population. They live as ‘floating underclass’ and stateless persons 
whose physical living should not be equated with psycho-social sense of 
belongingness. Second, pursuance of good life in terms of decent income, freedom 
from oppressive social control and prospects for a better future are the dominant 
economic rather than nationalistic motivating factors behind their migration to India. 
For most Bangladeshis in Delhi “the dominant identity, at least for the moment, is 
human beings whose basic need is to fill their stomachs” (Lin and Paul, 1995). Third, 
like their counterparts all over the world, they think transnationally when they remit 
money and make occasional visit back home.  
Unlike their early ‘repatriates’, they often retain regular contact with relatives in 
Bangladesh through transnational networks of increasing complexity” (Schendel, 
2005). Research on female migrant labour from Bangladesh to Mumbai and Kolkata 
unveils that they live their working life in India, possessed all official documents 
needed to survive there, but voted in successive elections in Bangladesh, and used 
remittances to buy property in their villages (Thomas, 2000). 
 
• Problems of reliable estimates on remittances 
In the absence of reliable data on the magnitude of migrants and remittances, 
consequences from cross-border migration are difficult to assess not to talk of 
quantification. Estimates from Indian sources suggest that Bangladesh earns 15 billion 
dollars annually by Bangladeshi migrants which contradicts estimates available from 
Bangladesh (Pathania, 2003). In the 2006 fiscal year remittances earned by 
Bangladeshi migrants from all over the world was equivalent to US$ 4.8 billion 
(Bangladesh Bank, 2007) and the foreign currency reserve of the country was US$ 3.4 
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billion. Moreover Bangladesh does not publish remittances data from India and in the 
absence of formal recording from the recipient country and in the context of high 
prevalence of informal nature of remittances transfer it is difficult to ascertain the 
magnitude of remittances.  
Cross-border informal migration and trading is facilitated by well developed 
network of capital markets or private forms of banking known as hundi or hawala 
based on trust and personal acquaintance at both sides of the border which help in 
transferring remittances at the quickest time with least transaction cost. For example, 
over 150 hundi agents offered their financial services to customers in a relatively 
small border town of Champainawabganj in Western Bangladesh in 2002 (The Daily 
Star, 22 September 2002). 
 
• Smuggling and trade links 
Pathania (2003) also argues that Bangladesh’s thriving leather and processed meat 
industry is booming due to cattle smuggling from India at a throw away price and 
then exported to the ME countries at almost 3-4 times the cost price. On a monthly 
basis, value of the smuggled cattle from West Bengal is worked out from Indian 
sources at about 0.5 million dollars. She further added the cattle smuggling industry 
provided employment opportunity to the laid off workers of the jute industry in 
Bangladesh. Whilst one may not argue with smuggling industry’s absorption potential 
the question may be raised as to who were involved in this business prior to laid-off 
workers of jute industry which took place around 2001-02 where as cattle smuggling 
has been in vogue for much longer time. The potential of generating employment 
opportunity in this industry for the border Landers from the Indian side cannot be 
ignored either. 
However, it is not only cattle smuggling but also the entire black marketing across 
border is highly profitable to traders of both sides. Official estimates from India 
suggest that the value of goods annually smuggled to Bangladesh from Northeast 
India alone exceeded Rs.20 billion or US$ 450 million (Kalyan Barooah, 2002).  It is 
often assumed that at least 40 to 50% of the economies of both India and Bangladesh 
are black (The Daily Star, 21 May 2002; Confederation of Indian Industry, Press 
Release, November 2000: www.ciionline.org/news/ pressrel/2000/Nov/28nov2.htm).  
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• Vicious cycle of low wage  
According to Samaddar (1999) migration of people from areas of low-productivity 
to high productivity areas does not establish equilibrium either for home or for the 
host country. This is because the wage rate in the economically depressed areas does 
not improve enough with the shortage of labour supply on the one hand, and on the 
other, wages do not level off at destination due to abundance of labour supply. 
Therefore he is in opinion that the pattern of economic development in South Asia 
and the accompanying structural adjustment have created and exacerbated the 
segmented nature of the labour market and the reproduction level of skilled labour i.e. 
enskilling process remained narrow in scope. 
 
4.1.      Management Problem and Ambivalent Policies 
• Problems of identification of migrants 
For a culturally and geo-politically diverse country like India it is extremely 
difficult to distinguish Bangladeshi migrants from the mainstream Indian population 
because of physical semblances, cultural and linguistic affinity with Indian Bengalis. 
They also share cultural norms with Indian Muslim communities. In India only 30% 
to 40% births are registered compared to 12% in Bangladesh. In the absence of large 
scale birth registration and any centralized register for citizens, it is both difficult and 
expensive for the Indian state to identify migrants from Bangladesh and determine 
their magnitude. Moreover many of them have fraudulently procured ration cards, 
birth and school certificates, voters identity card and those with money and 
connections, it is not very difficult to manage even Indian passport. It is not 
uncommon to find tripartite support networks in the process of migration and 
aftermath. To quote Schendel (2005: 220): “Unauthorised migration took place within 
an extended community that transcended the border. Economic and political actors on 
either side were mutually dependent: earlier immigrants offer newcomers shelter and 
support, Indian employers were keen to exploit cheap labour, and Indian politicians 
were interested in expanding their electorate”.  
 
• Vacillating policies and attitudes 
Continuously changing regulations and evasions, change in policy thrust from 
“homecoming” to “infiltration” and finally to deporting clearly indicate ambivalence 
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in Indian attitude toward cross-border migrants from Bangladesh. The Assam 
government switched from homecoming to infiltration thesis in 1980s after violent 
anti-Bengali disturbances over land, resources and election issues. Authorities in 
Delhi and Mumbai adhere to the same doctrine after a decade after the rightist parties 
came to power there, the West Bengal government also join the bandwagon albeit 
after 1999 (Schendel, 2005). Notwithstanding imposition of some of the regulatory 
measures and barbed wire fences, the Indian state did not take any measure to identify 
slave-importing schemes working from Indian soil and protected by the state agents 
who derive benefits from them both at the border and at the place of employment 
(brothels, brickfields, factories, homes).  
 
• Non-recognition on the part of Bangladesh creates more problems than respite 
On the other hand, the Bangladesh state did not interfere with the flourishing 
migrant export industry but occasionally involved in thwarting slave-importing 
schemes destined for India given that these are less beneficial economically but more 
embarrassing politically as it involves publicity risk from human rights groups both at 
home and abroad. Increasingly, cross-border migration is associated with security 
threats and destination based crime (Ramachandran, 2005).  
However, mutual blaming by India and Bangladesh periodically for harbouring 
insurgents antagonistic to their national interest has long been in place. Whilst India 
accuses Bangladesh for allowing access to United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) 
and the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), Bangladesh also blames 
India for sheltering the Swadhin Bangobhumi Andolon (SBA) and United Peoples 
Democratic Front (UPDF), and also criminals and local mastaans (goons) wanted in 
Bangladesh. India currently claims that there are 119 anti-Indian insurgent camps 
inside Bangladesh, while Bangladesh put the number anti-Bangladeshi camps at 39 in 
India (Ahmed, 2007). 
What is worse is instead of working for the welfare of migrants and for a 
politically and economically viable policy measure consistent with globalisation and 
regional cooperative framework, “Bangladesh callously ignored the plight of millions 
of Bangladeshi citizens whose right to work and decent life were thwarted at home 
and who voted with feet, thereby exposing the multiple ways in which the economic, 
political and social system in Bangladesh has failed them. It stripped migrants to India 
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off their Bangladeshi citizenship because they were in a national space where the 
Bangladeshi state found it inconvenient to acknowledge them. By turning the 
Bangladeshi diaspora into a numbers game, and by variously criminalising and 
disowning individual migrants, politicians in both countries gambled with the future 
of millions of Bangladeshis living, by force or by choice, beyond the territory of their 
state” (Schendel, 2005: 234).13 
 
4.2. Policy Recommendations 
Cross-border migration between India and Bangladesh needs clear 
understanding, recognition, more information on the magnitude and operation of 
undocumented migration and effective management. Effective management is very 
much dependent on mutual as well as bi-lateral agreement along with regional, 
multilateral and international cooperation.  It is clear that no barbed wire and 
draconian legal measures so far could stop cross-border population movements. Given 
the economic bottom-line, political sensitivity, cultural and socio-religious 
complications, the opening of a legal channel of migration may be considered as the 
most feasible option. It also raises the question of how best to manage it.  
In this regard it may be worthwhile to consider allowing entry of migrant and 
providing them a free pass that would entitle them to have minimum wage and other 
entitlement accessible to an Indian daily or contractual labour while at work. Like 
Thailand’s MOUs with Burma, Cambodia, and Laos that enable migrant workers in 
Thailand’s to receive equal wages and benefits, and has a provision of security money 
to the tune of 15% of their wages to assure returns and provide funds for development 
in migrant areas of origin, similar type of MOU could be drawn between Bangladesh 
and India. However, in order to minimise the scope of proliferation of greater illegal 
migration with the apprehension of detection and crack-down of illegal migrants, the 
national identity cards to all residents in India may be issued beforehand.  
Efforts to combat the illegal movement of people require to go beyond 
improved policing and address the causes of the movement and of the involvements 
of various agents e.g. dalals, brokers and smugglers supporting it. Policies and 
programs need to be consistent and comprehensive across the both participating 
                                                 
13 However, one may contest his allegation of ‘criminalization’ of individual migrants in the absence of 
reliable statistics and evidence. Instead one may argue that policies and political bias of both countries 
on cross-border migration issues helped thriving sub-agents and intermediaries at the cost of migrants’ 
welfare and state revenue. 
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nations and groups involved. International bodies e.g. International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM), International labour organisation (ILO) may be involved to 
implement an international migration regime with adequate legislations in both 
countries and effective mechanisms for sanctions so that potential illegal migrants feel 
they have a fair chance of immigrating through the legal system.  
Following Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation’s (APEC’s) initiative of 
economic growth by reducing barriers to the free flow of trade, South Asia Free Trade 
Area (SAFTA) must be implemented with such schemes as APEC Business Travel 
Card to provide for flexible travel arrangements for business and reduce the time and 
costs for applying entry visas and permits for participating countries. It is not simply a 
matter of trade liberalisation and free movement of traders but the need for India to 
focus more on administrative reforms and efficiency, improved infrastructure and 
minimising border delays for realising benefits from free trade agreement with 
Bangladesh. Obviously it calls for greater investment in infrastructure along with 
good governance and change of attitude and culture. SAARC can be used for 
implementing an integrated labour market strategy. Institutions and policies must be 
so designed as to ensure transparency in migration and for creating level-playing 
grounds that are likely to ensure more efficiency and harness greater benefits from 
migration while minimizing the risks of illegal migration and negative externalities.   
As a part of partial implementation of SAFTA, the seven Indian land-locked 
states bordering Bangladesh from western side must be given permission to hold free-
trade with India. In essence it means that the Sylhet broder should be opened up for 
trade links and communication channels for Bangladesh and Indian North-Eastern 
states. This bold step can bring win-win options for both Bangladesh and India. 
Whilst Bangladesh is likely to get an opportunity to make-up for the unfavourable 
trade balance with India, and on the other hand, it would help India to facilitate 
development in that part of the country which may in turn help reduce the separatist 
movements. 
It is important to realise that illegal migration is essentially a human problem 
caused by arbitrariness of the Radcliffe border and aggravated by poverty, limited 
employment opportunities at home and environmental hazards e.g. recurrent floods, 
cyclones and other disasters. Therefore, the policy makers need to come out from the 
traditional security paradigm and make what Castles said (2003: 22) a “conceptual 
leap” to recognise the long-term significance of migration and settlement in the 
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region. While respecting due rights of its own citizens, as the biggest and mighty 
neighbour India must also offer humanitarian assistance to stateless people, available 
to them through a range of international regimes. Government and elites of 
Bangladesh have also failed to cultivate time-tested friends in India and the civil 
society too has limited success.  
Whilst SAARC University is a good effort to strengthen regional cooperation, 
the need for collaborative research on cross-border migration is paramount. Civil 
society groups, particularly researchers and professionals must undertake scholarly 
research in collaboration with Indian researchers to generate understandings on the 
complexities involved in the process of transnational migration between India and 
Bangladesh to counter stereotypes about migrants, biases toward migration process 
and its outcomes for both countries. Both countries must come to an agreement for 
commonly accepted data generation of the different types of movements across border 
including return migration.  
In the end, remarks made by a Bangladeshi fisherman, who had been 
travelling back and forth crossing the India-Bangladesh border at the eastern side on 
how cross-border migration could be stopped may be worth quoting: 
Can the river stop flowing? Can you block the rains? People who talk about 
such things do not know what they are saying. The Assamese (Indian) need us, 
we (Bangladeshi) need them (Hazarika, 2000: 194).  
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